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


RESEARCH AID

**THE ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP OF CHINA'S
PARTY CONSOLIDATION CAMPAIGN**

*A Report Prepared under an Interagency Agreement
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Library of Congress*

June 1984



Author: Robert L. Worden


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PREFACE

This research aid was prepared in support of estimative work on future Party leadership as it relates to the consolidation and rectification process in the Chinese Communist Party. It is one of an ongoing series of studies based on an open source computerized data base of current Chinese military, political, and government leaders on the national, regional, and provincial levels. Information used in this study is based on Chinese media sources published between October 1983 and May 1984.

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
SUMMARY -----	iv
1. INTRODUCTION -----	1
2. ORGANIZATION -----	3
a. Administration -----	3
b. Functions -----	5
3. LEADERSHIP -----	5
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PLA -----	9
NOTES -----	13

APPENDIX

A. The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Party Consolidation (October 11, 1983) -----	15
B. Party Consolidation Commission Leadership -----	29

ILLUSTRATION

Chart - Functional Relationships of Party Consolidation Organs -----	2
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TABLES

1. Provincial-Level Units with Party Consolidation Committees, December 1983-April 1984 -----	4
2. Important Meetings of the Party Consolidation Commission, October 1983-March 1984 -----	6
3. Circulars Published by the Party Consolidation Commission, October 1983-March 1984 -----	7

SUMMARY

The comprehensive rectification program of the Chinese Communist Party has progressed in earnest since the 2d Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee convened in October 1983. Set up as a 3-year program of Dengist-inspired reform and reorganization, the process has required the establishment of various administrative organs and the continuous readjustment of the Party's modus operandi. A Central Commission for Guiding Party Consolidation, liaison groups operating between the top leadership and lower-level Party organs in the government and political sectors, local "guidance" groups, and formal Party consolidation committees at subnational levels were brought into existence, mostly by December 1983. At each of these levels, key political figures were given responsibility for this latest reform effort. The Party Consolidation Commission itself is chaired by Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang who, in turn, delegated his authority to a Work Council led by Party elder Bo Yibo. The Commission, largely staffed by pro-Deng Xiaoping senior Party, government, and military leaders, and advised by an elite group of Politburo members, is a cross section of the current regime.

Ostensibly, the People's Liberation Army is treated in the same manner as any other organization in the campaign but in fact is carrying out Party consolidation under the direction of the General Political Department (the director of which, Yu Qiuli, is a vice chairman of the Party Consolidation Commission) which answers directly to the Party's Central Military Commission (chaired by Deng Xiaoping). Both the military and civilian sectors in this campaign are faced with the same problems--acceptance, implementation, and continuation over the long-term of still another post-Mao campaign of organizational reform aimed at insuring the success of the four modernizations and smooth transition to the post-Deng Xiaoping period.

THE ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP OF CHINA'S PARTY CONSOLIDATION CAMPAIGN

1. INTRODUCTION

"... party rectification is a revolutionary practice of unprecedentedly profound self-reform in the new period for party organizations and party members [the primary] purpose . . . is to make the party organization more powerful. . . . It has reestablished the Marxist line. . . ."1


With these words, after half a year of development, the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) reform effort was described in the Chinese mass media. The effort began in earnest at the 2d Plenary Session of the 12th CCP Central Committee, held in Beijing on 11-12 October 1983, which launched "an overall rectification of Party style and a consolidation of Party organizations over a period of three years beginning in the latter half of 1983."2 A 13,000-word document was issued as a guideline for carrying out the rectification and consolidation* program. It outlined the needs, tasks, and duties of Party members and leading cadres; and methods, organizational measures, and warnings against over-enthusiasm in implementing this new campaign. (The full text of the 2d Plenum decision is included as appendix A.)

The reform effort was designed to be carried out in two stages. The first stage, to begin in Winter 1983-84, was to include reform of Party organizations at the:

- central and provincial (provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities) levels;
- party organizations of the various ministries, commissions, offices, departments, and bureaus of these two levels; and
- Party organizations of the leading bodies of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Departments, services and arms, and the 11 military regions.

During the first stage, provincial-level organizations were to designate "some" Party organizations at the prefectural and county levels to carry out pilot consolidation programs. The second stage of Party consolidation, slated to begin in Winter 1984-85, is to encompass all remaining Party committees. The PLA General Political Department and the provincial-level organizations are to "make concrete arrangements, in accordance with their actual conditions, on the ways of carrying out the work by groups during this stage." The accompanying figure shows the functional relationship of the various organs of Party consolidation.

*The Chinese use the terms rectification [zhengdun] and consolidation [zhengdang] interchangeably although there is a subtle difference in meaning depending on the context. As they appear in the 2d Plenum decision, rectification means correcting Party work style and organization, while consolidation means reorganizing Party organizations.



*Possibly the same organization; if different, the functional relationship is unclear.

**Appear to have succeeded the "guidance groups."

Functional Relationships of Party Consolidation Organs.

Included in the Party's decision was the order to establish a Central Commission for Guiding Party Consolidation [Zhong Gong zhongyang zhengdang gongzuo zhidao weiyuanhui] and to set up "competent administrative bodies." The Party Consolidation Commission, which is directly subordinate to the CCP Central Committee, has as its "main tasks":

- monitoring the current political situation,
- studying and transmitting Party policies, and
- supervising Party reform work.

In implementing these tasks, the Party Consolidation Commission was instructed in the 2d Plenum decision to "issue in succession various supplementary stipulations and issue in good time circulars on important matters, problems and experiences concerning party consolidation. . . ." Provincial,

municipal, and autonomous region CCP committees were ordered to complete the reform of organizations at the county and commune (township) levels in 1984 to facilitate Party consolidation locally. Eventually, the program is to reach all levels of Party organization. By the end of 1983, all of these activities were underway, and, by May 1984, the "examination and comparison" of work accomplished was well underway.

2. ORGANIZATION

a. Administration

Various administrative elements of the Party rectification and consolidation process were established after the 2d Plenum. The key organization is the Central Commission for Guiding Party Consolidation, elected at the 2d Plenum on 12 October 1983. It is headed by a chairman (Hu Yaobang) and five vice chairmen, one of whom (Bo Yibo) serves as a permanent or executive vice chairman and is in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the Commission. Additionally, the Commission has 16 members and 5 advisers.³ The members are mostly mid-level Party and State Council bureaucrats, while the advisers are CCP Political Bureau incumbents and "second line" (advisory) members of the regime. Details on the backgrounds of the Commission leadership are provided in section 3 below.

Several functional organizations directly subordinate to the Party Consolidation Commission also have been established. One, identified simply as the Office or General Office of the Commission, was first noted on 9 December and another, the Work or Executive Council [bangong huiyu], was noted for the first time on 11 December.⁴ It is possible that the Office and Work Council is actually the same organization and that it functions as Bo Yibo's personal staff.

Initially, the work of Party rectification was carried out somewhat independently of the Commission and was based largely on local interpretations of the 2d Plenum documents and subsequent Commission instructions. By November 1983 organs directly under the Central Committee and the State Council had organized their own Party rectification groups with "leading responsible comrades" as group members. Party organizations throughout China set up "guidance groups" to study the various rectification documents and carry out reforms in their departments. Workloads were adjusted so that both Party rectification and the normal functions of the various departments could proceed evenly. Generally, one member of the CCP organ was assigned to supervise Party rectification and consolidation while another was dedicated to routine administrative work.⁵

Evidently, to correct the relative independence of these local guidance groups, the Party Consolidation Commission dispatched "liaison officer groups" to various national, provincial, regional, and municipal Party and government organs to carry out the "main tasks" of the Commission itself.⁶ Liaison officer groups were first dispatched in December 1983. By early January 1984, in recognition of "developments and problems in [P]arty rectification work," the Commission, with the approval of the Central Committee, decided to "classify departments and commissions into 10 different divisions. . . ."⁷

The divisions, designed to work under the direction of the Commission, are:

- o party and mass work,
- o political and legal affairs,
- o propaganda and education,
- o general affairs,
- o industry and transport,
- o defense industry,
- o agriculture and forestry,
- o finance and trade,
- o science and technology, and
- o foreign affairs.

The founding meeting of the 10 divisions was held on 3 January 1984 and was attended by members of the Party Consolidation Commission's Work Council. The 10-division classification covers all departments and commissions of the CCP Central Committee and the various State organs, including the PLA. Part of the 3 January meeting was devoted to self-criticism by Work Council members who admitted that there were "many tasks" in the Party rectification process which they "[had] not grasped as promptly, profoundly, and meticulously as they should." Specifically, in the 2 months which had elapsed since the Commission had received its mandate, the Work Council "[could] not say how work [had] progressed."⁸

In conjunction with the liaison officer groups and the 10-division classification, provincial-level Party rectification and consolidation committees were established under the auspices of the Party Consolidation Commission in most provinces, regions, and special municipalities.

It was only after the center's recognition of problems in carrying out Party rectification and consolidation at lower levels that the local-level "guidance groups" became more formalized and were brought closer in line with the Party Consolidation Commission itself. Between December 1983 and April 1984, 22 of China's 29 provincial-level units established party consolidation committees and identified their leaders. Table 1 provides a list of provincial-level units that have established such committees.

Table 1

Provincial-Level Units with Party Consolidation Committees,
December 1983-April 1984

(Provincial-level units with committees are shown in **boldface**;
those not in boldface have yet to form committees)

Anhui	Hebei	Liaoning	Shanxi
Beijing	Henan	Nei Monggol	Sichuan
Fujian	Hubei	Ningxia	Tianjin
Gansu	Hunan	Qinghai	Xinjiang
Guangdong	Jiangsu	Shaanxi	Xizang
Guangxi	Jiangxi	Shandong	Yunnan
Guizhou	Jilin	Shanghai	Zhejiang
Heilongjiang			

These committees, in turn, sent out their own liaison groups to various departments, bureaus, and commissions of the provincial-level Party, government, and armed forces. In the meantime, liaison groups under the Party Consolidation Commission continued to visit various provincial capitals, attend meetings, and audit study classes.

Three months after the establishment of the 10 divisions, the Party Consolidation Commission determined many units had not met the study requirements laid down by the Commission. Renmin Ribao labeled the situation as "dangerous" but capable of being remedied if Party members come to realize that "the question of the party's style is related to the life and death of [the] party."⁹

b. Functions

In carrying out its designated mandate, the Party Consolidation Commission has been involved in a number of activities. It has held plenary sessions as well as Work Council meetings; there undoubtedly have been more meetings held than have been reported in the Chinese media. Table 2 lists the dates and agenda of meetings that have been publicized directly (specific date) or indirectly (a "circa" or "prior to" date). Significant developments reached at these meetings, commanded special publicity as evidenced by the transmission of "public notices" urging all Chinese newspapers to "frontpage in a prominent position" the usually lengthy Xinhua reports on important Party consolidation meetings.¹⁰ Such notices, in the form of what Xinhua called "notes," also have been used to publicize local rectification activities of nationwide interest.¹¹ More commonly, circulars were issued for dissemination without further comment to all Party rectification and consolidation cadres throughout China and to the general public. A list of the circulars is provided in table 3.

Tables 2 and 3 provide indications of the actual work of the Commission. It serves as an interpretive conduit for the important directives and writings of the top leaders to cadres implementing those directives and to society in general. The Commission also hears progress reports, makes on-the-spot corrections, sponsors rotational training classes for liaison and guidance group members, and oversees the rectification work of the 10 divisions of Party and State organs. In the more formalized milieu of the post-December 1983 period, similar directional and liaison functions are performed by Party committees and branches in national, provincial, and municipal levels, and within military organizations, all under the general guidance of the Party Consolidation Commission.

3. LEADERSHIP

The Party Consolidation Commission comprises 27 members. Only two are female, none are members of China's minority nationalities, most are superannuated, and are more or less evenly divided between northern and southern Chinese origins. As a functional group designated to "ensure the day-to-day leadership" of the nationwide reform effort, commission members are well-qualified. Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang is the titular chairman of the Commission, while day-to-day operations are the duty of Bo Yibo, the 76-year-old concurrent Vice Chairman of the CCP Central Advisory Commission and State

Table 2

Important Meetings of the Party Consolidation Commission,
October 1983-March 1984

<u>Date</u>	<u>Agenda</u>
21 Oct 83	Decision to publicize Circular No. 1 and to urge leading Party organs to study the "must" reading list embodied in the circular.
4 Nov 83	Discussed and adopted Circular No. 2 and made decisions on "some questions regarding the present work" of Party consolidation.
ca 21 Nov 83	Ordered that opinions of "all peoples outside the party will be given full heed" during the 3-year process; issued Circular No. 3.
prior to 3 Dec 83	Work Council met with members of first six liaison groups for purposes of instructing them on their duties; subsequently issued Circular No. 4.
prior to ca 16 Dec 83	Restructured first-stage Party rectification to set up two groups: one for rectification work, one for routine work; issued Circular No. 5.
prior to ca 1 Jan 84	Corrected "misdeeds" of Party rectification cadres; issued Circular No. 6.
3 Jan 84	Established 10 divisions to "guide, help, supervise, speed up and examine" Party consolidation work in their respective departments; attended by Work Council members. A second (?) work meeting held the same day heard a progress report from the Ministry of Machine Building (Xinhua reported the meetings as two separate items).
ca 4 Mar 84	Corrected "mistakes in the course of rectification" and launched "examination and comparison stage"; issued Circular No. 7.
19-21 Mar 84	Heard reports from various ministries and provincial Party committees; placed stress on raising ideological awareness.

Table 3

Circulars Published by the Party Consolidation Commission,
October 1983-March 1984

<u>No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Title</u>
1	22 Oct 83	"Party Members Must Reading List"
2	14 Nov 83	"A Concise Edition of Important Documents Since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee"
3	ca 21 Nov 83	"Eight Point Circular" [concerning non-party and democratic party suggestions on Party consolidation]
4	10 Dec 83	"On Dispatching Groups of Liaison Officers"
5	16 Dec 83	"Concerning the Necessity To Set Up Two Groups By Party Committee and Party Organization of the Units Taking Part in the First-Stage Party Rectification"
6	1 Jan 84	"Urging Party Committees and Leading Party Groups in First-Stage Party Rectification to Implement the Principle of Rectifying Party Organizations and Correcting Their Misdeeds Simultaneously"
7	4 Mar 84	"On Several Things That Must Be Attended To At The Comparison and Examination Stage"

Councillor (both "second line" advisory positions). Bo serves as the Permanent Vice Chairman and, as such, is the key public leader of the consolidation and rectification effort. The other vice chairmen all hold "first line" Party, government, and military positions. Wan Li is the senior Vice Premier of the State Council and a Politburo member. Yu Qiuli holds a multiplicity of positions, the most important are Director of the PLA General Political Department, member of the Politburo, and Deputy Secretary General of the CCP Military Commission. Hu Qili, as are Wan and Yu, is a member of the CCP Secretariat. Hu serves concurrently as director of the CCP's General Office. The fourth vice chairman, Wang Heshou, is the Permanent Secretary of the CCP's Discipline Inspection Commission.

Of the 16 individuals categorized as "members" of the Party Consolidation Commission, all but two hold significant national-level Party, government, or military jobs. A six-person group of "advisors" is made up of elderly Politburo members.

One other important Chinese leader, not appointed to the Party Consolidation Commission at the 2d Plenum, is associated with the Commission's Work Council. Alternate Member of the CCP Secretariat Qiao Shi was noted with Commission members Bo Yibo and Song Renqiong and "the comrades of the Work Council" as having met with 105 Party consolidation liaison officials at Zhongnanhai in December 1983.¹² Originally from Zhejiang, a 60-year-old Cultural Revolution rehabilitee, and Deng supporter, Qiao was director of the CCP's International Liaison Department until mid-1983. His role with the Commission is unknown and, since he was not among the October 1983 appointees, he has not been included among the individuals listed in the tables on the next pages.

Selection criteria for Commission members seem varied. While all serve in some capacity at the central level, only 16 of the 27 are members of the current CCP Central Committee. Just over half, however, hold Party positions as their primary duty. Of the remainder, seven are career government or state officials and six are military leaders. As with all top Chinese leaders, the 27 hold positions in two or more organizations.

A typical Chinese organization, the Party Consolidation Commission is dominated by the older Party members. The average age of Commission members is 71 years. The oldest member is 79, the youngest 43, as shown in appendix B1 which also provides the places of birth of the Commission members.

The Long March is the single most common shared experience of this sample, with 11 Commission members having participated in it. Appendix B2 provides a list of participants in historical events. A significant number (14), however, are not known to have participated in any of the major events of the Chinese Communist revolution and founding of the People's Republic.

As is to be expected in an era dominated by Deng Xiaoping, the Commission largely comprises persons who suffered politically during the Cultural Revolution, have been rehabilitated, and are either members of Deng's inner circle or supporters of his reform program. Only six Commission members are not Cultural Revolution rehabilitees and only four are known not to be closely

associated with or are supporters of the Deng group. The political orientations of eight of the individuals is uncertain and are listed as "unknown" in appendix B3.

Well over half of the Party Consolidation Commission have had contacts with the Soviet Union and the United States. Sixteen have had some kind of Soviet contact, as shown in appendix B4. The single most common Soviet experience of these leaders was travel to the Soviet Union, mostly since 1949. Fifteen have had similar contacts with the United States (see appendix B5).

Appendix B6 lists the primary line of work of each leader. Fifteen are Party leaders or bureaucrats while the government and military have six representatives each on the Commission. Appendix B7 provides a complete list of all current (and concurrent) positions held by the 27 Commission members. Appendix B8 provides the military branch of service (all are members of the ground forces--"Army") and specialization for the six military leaders who are Commission members.

4. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PLA

As noted in section 3 above, six (or 23 percent) of the members of the Party Consolidation Commission are members of the armed forces. Considering the key positions held by these individuals, the PLA should have significant input to the process. Three are members of the CCP Politburo while the other three are veteran members of the various PLA General Departments.

The October 1983 Central Committee decision on Party rectification and consolidation is applicable to all Party members including those in the military. Although seldom mentioned by name or direct implication, the PLA received as much attention as any other sector and almost all Party consolidation rules that apply to other sectors apply to the PLA. In the first stage of Party consolidation, the leading Party organs of the three General Departments, the national-level headquarters of the various services and arms, and the military region headquarters are to be affected. In the second stage, some latitude is allowed in that the General Political Department (and provincial-level civilian CCP organs) "may [emphasis added] make concrete arrangements, in accordance with their actual conditions, on ways of carrying out the work by groups during this stage." In the area of recruitment of new Party members from among underrepresented non-elite sectors, PLA soldiers and officers were included in a list of workers, young peasants, intellectuals, students, women, and minorities.

There is no clear evidence that the PLA has established special Party consolidation groups but that, under the direct guidance of the PLA General Political Department, Party organs at various echelons are carrying out the process. This is in variance with the civilian Party sector which has set up special guidance and liaison groups to rectify their political activities.

Immediately following the Party decision, the PLA announced that 92 percent of Party members in the armed forces had already undergone ideological training "as a preliminary for the nationwide party consolidation. . . ."13 Always in the vanguard, PLA rotational ideological training had started early

in 1983 with "all participants measur[ing] themselves by the basic requirements prescribed in the party constitution. . . ."14 Attitudes toward promotions, removals, and transfers of personnel were examined. In accordance with the Central Committee's decision, it was announced that leading PLA headquarters would "go through the consolidation process."

At a late November 1983 discussion on improving PLA education and training, Party Consolidation Commission Vice Chairman and Director of the PLA General Political Department Yu Qiuli called on all PLA Party members, "officers in particular," to study the consolidation documents and listen to the opinions of the rank-and-file soldiers in making criticism and self-criticism.¹⁵

While addressing a 30 November 1983 enlarged meeting of the CCP Committee of the PLA General Political Department, Yu also disclosed some organizational details on how the military was handling Party consolidation. He noted that the process was being carried out by the General Political Department under guidance "mapped out by the party Central Committee and [emphasis added] its Military Commission." Major PLA units were to study the 2d Plenum speeches of Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun on Party consolidation and the elimination of "spiritual pollution." Yu noted that "serious problems" had been discovered in the ideological sphere after preliminary investigation of first-stage activities. Judgment on Yu's critical comments evidently was reserved for almost a month until "leading comrades" had deemed them as "excellent, comprehensive and completely in line with the realities in various localities and departments" and allowed the Party Consolidation Commission to publish them.¹⁶

Comments by Chengdu Military Region Commander Wang Chenghan were even more pointed and important enough to have been published in Renmin Ribao before Yu's speech was publicized. Wang called on his peers to be more serious about Party rectification and to take the lead in carrying out the process. He argued that since the Army is "the mainstay of the people's democratic dictatorship," it is vitally important that leading military cadres receive the same Party education and examination as all other Party members. He noted that military leaders were not immune from the pernicious effects of the Cultural Revolution and the "gang of four" and were, thus, not above the criticism and self-criticism process and must correct their own mistakes and those of others.¹⁷

A high-level echo of the sentiments expressed by Wang came in January and February 1984 when CCP Military Commission Vice Chairman Yang Shangkun and Xu Xiangqian called on senior military leaders to set good examples in the Party consolidation process. Yang called for an end to weak, incompetent, and lax leadership and abuse of power while Xu urged the more conservative approach of "fostering a good party style."¹⁸ Both comments received wide publicity with Yang's being reported as part of a 7-day Army Conference on Party Consolidation (also addressed by Party consolidation commissioners Bo Yibo and Yu Qiuli), while Xu's, a reminiscence on his 60-year career, appeared in Renmin Ribao and major Beijing newspapers.

Examples of the PLA's consolidation efforts have seldom been reported. One such report, appearing in early January 1984, noted the problems confronting the PLA General Logistics Department in carrying out routine work concurrent with study of Party consolidation instructions. As with the civilian sector, rotational training classes enabled the Department to successfully carry on work and study. The experience of a financial unit of the General Political Department, faced with carrying out an all-army financial checkup amid an acute shortage of manpower, was offered as a model. An attendance system was established to check on those who had not received rotational training and to provide copies of notes taken by cadres who had attended. Inspectors who had been in the field for extended periods of time were called back for rotational study while those who could not return had study materials mailed to them. To further facilitate the process, study sessions concentrated on specific topics rather than a comprehensive study of all the Central Committee had demanded.¹⁹

In March 1984, the Party Consolidation Commission hailed the success of the Beijing Military Region in carrying out the directives embodied in Circular No. 7 (4 March 1984). The region's CCP committee had taken the lead in carrying out "heart-to-heart talks" rather than "seizing on somebody's mistakes or shortcomings." No more "opinions" were to be filed and Party members were allowed to withdraw, change, defend, and hold back their opinions. All this was seen as having given "tremendous impetus" to the consolidation process in the PLA.²⁰ At the same time, the General Political Department issued its own circular calling "for all those Army units required [emphasis added] to carry out party rectification in the first phase," to study Circular No. 7's guidelines. The General Political Department, however, rephrased only selected parts of the eight-points covered in Circular No. 7.²¹ The PLA version, geared to the needs of the armed forces, included four points:

- major units must "strictly examine subordinate units according to the joint Party Consolidation and Military Commissions' guidelines," with stress to be put on actual military conditions;
- all units must solve problems actually facing the military;
- secretaries and deputy secretaries of CCP committees in PLA units must play a leading role in listening to opinions, treating others as equals, and "daring to make criticism and self-criticism"; and
- Party rectification and reform must be carried out simultaneously.

In early April 1984, Xinhua publicized the experience of the Fuzhou Military Region CCP Committee which had "seriously correct[ed] its work style" by soliciting suggestions from military region forces and establishing three principles.²² These principles are:

- listen in an open and analytical way to the "views of the masses" of the regional PLA;
- listen not only to one side, do not draw hasty conclusions when the facts are not clear, and do not leave any "after effects" in resolving a question; and
- acquire "a firm attitude" and adopt "practical measures" for the Party rectification.

In deference to Dengist ideology, the Fuzhou Party leaders stated their determination to carry out the rectification process in accordance with the principle of "seeking truth from facts. . . ." Among the problems rectified by the Fuzhou Military Region CCP Committee were "bureaucratic work style" (which had resulted in improper or no care for disabled personnel), abusing positions for personal gain, and recruiting violations involving children of people who had "under-the-counter relationships" with the Military Regions and children of relatives of the region's principal leaders.

The Dengist theme of seeking truth from facts was cited in late April 1984 by Politburo member and Shenyang Military Region Commander Li Desheng as the best means for carrying out Party rectification.²³ Li also championed the cause of the four modernizations, saying that the economy "is the basis . . . and it is not permitted to interfere in . . . economic work in any form and under any pretext." He noted that some relatives of PLA fighters had experienced "temporary difficulties" when a "contract responsibility system" was implemented in rural areas while some older comrades did not want to retire--both instances of personal interests being placed above Party interests. In preaching to an audience considerably wider than the PLA, Li concluded that only when "individualism is eliminated" and Dengist formulations are followed will Party rectification be possible and the interests of the people be established.

The same pro-Dengist theme, this time sounded by Guangzhou Military Political Commissar Wang Meng, was given similarly wide publicity (both appeared in Renmin Ribao) several days later.²⁴ Wang, however, was critical of his PLA comrades who were "ideologically fettered by old convention" and who "failed to create conditions to solve their problems" in the face of the availability of only limited funds for military modernization.

In early May 1984, an anonymous "contributing commentator's" article in Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily] discussed the campaign from a different perspective. It said that the root of the problem of Party rectification and consolidation within the military lies with the leadership.²⁵ The problem was seen as particularly critical at the "third echelon" of junior leaders. The improvement of leadership organs at this echelon was seen as a "major strategic measure" on which the future good of the military rests. Despite recent successful efforts to lower the average age of military leaders, the Jiefangjun Bao commentator warned against laxness in pursuing this type of reform. He demanded that the process be made an enduring one and include grooming younger successors who are "more revolutionized, better educated, [and] professionally more competent. . . ." He insisted that third echelon work is an integral part of the Party consolidation process and warned that the 3-year period set aside to carry out the process "will soon elapse if we relax our efforts or adopt a devil-may-care attitude."

NOTES

¹Chang Yanzhi, "Promote the Spirit of Being Brave in Carrying Out Reforms and Innovation," Guangming Ribao (Beijing), 14 April 1984, p. 3, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China (hereafter, FBIS/China), 2 May 1984, pp. K13-15.

²"The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China On Party Consolidation (October 11, 1983)," Beijing Review, no. 42, 17 October 1983, pp. I-XII. A Chinese-language version of the decision was published in Hongqi, no. 20, 16 October 1983, pp. 3-17. The entire Beijing Review translation has been reproduced as an appendix to this study.

³Beijing Xinhua, 12 October 1983, in FBIS/China, 13 October 1983, p. K18.

⁴Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 9 December 1983, in FBIS/China, 12 December 1983, p. K18; and Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 11 December 1983, in FBIS/China, 13 December 1983, p. K3.

⁵Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 28 November 1983, in FBIS/China, 2 December 1983, p. K4 for a report on the Central Committee organs; and Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 29 November 1983, in FBIS/China, 5 December 1983, pp. K1-2 for a report on State organs.

⁶Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 11 December 1983, op cit., p. K2.

⁷Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 5 January 1984, in FBIS/China, 6 January 1984, p. K15.

⁸Ibid., p. K16.

⁹Dong Feng, "Do 'They' Understand or Not?" Renmin Ribao, 5 April 1984, p. 8, in FBIS/China, 10 April 1984, p. K2.

¹⁰For example, see Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 30 March 1984, in FBIS/China, 2 April 1984, p. K5.

¹¹See, for example, a Party Consolidation Commission "note" on the abolition of an entire CCP committee in Tianjin for having harbored Cultural Revolution holdovers. Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 13 May 1984, in FBIS/China, 16 May 1984, pp. K20-21.

¹²Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 27 December 1984, in FBIS/China, 30 December 1983, p. K16.

¹³Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 19 October 1983 (NEXIS).

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 1 December 1983, which cited a 1 December 1983 Jiefangjun Bao article (NEXIS).

¹⁶Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 23 December 1983, in FBIS/China, 29 December 1983, pp. K12-15.

¹⁷Wang Chenghan, "Leading Cadres Must Play an Exemplary Role in Party Rectification," Renmin Ribao, 13 December 1983, p. 5, in FBIS/China, 15 December 1983, pp. K12-14.

¹⁸Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 21 January 1984 (Yu Qiuli) and 14 February 1984 (Xu Xiangqian) (NEXIS).

¹⁹Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 4 January 1984, in FBIS/China, 5 January 1984, pp. K4-5.

²⁰Guangzhou Guangdong Provincial Service, 9 March 1984, in China Report, JPRS-CPS-84-023, 28 March 1984, p. 68.

²¹Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 14 March 1984, in FBIS/China, 16 March 1984, pp. K1-2.

²²Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 2 April 1984, in FBIS/China, 4 April 1984, pp. K4-5.

²³Li Desheng, "Persistently Seeking Truth From Facts Is the Key to Unifying the Thinking of the Whole Party," first published in Lilun yu Shijian [Theory and Practice] (Shenyang), no. 4, 1984, reprinted in Renmin Ribao, 20 April 1984, p. 5, in FBIS/China, 30 April 1984, pp. K7-12.

²⁴Wang Meng, "It is Necessary to Persistently Seek Truth From Facts Throughout the Course of Party Rectification," Renmin Ribao, 24 April 1984, p. 5, in FBIS/China, 2 May 1984, pp. K11-13.

²⁵"Building the Third Echelon Is a Strategic Task," Jiefangjun Bao (Beijing), 5 May 1984, as reported on by Beijing Domestic Service, 5 May 1984, in FBIS/China, 7 May 1984, pp. K11-12.

Appendix A

The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Party Consolidation (October 11, 1983)

This appendix provides the full text of the 13,000-word "Decision" on Party rectification adopted at the 2d Plenary Session of the 12th CCP Central Committee on 11 October 1983. It is reproduced from the authoritative Beijing Review, no. 42, 17 October 1983, pp. I-XII. The "Decision" includes the following major sections:

- (1) The Necessity and Urgency of Party Consolidation
- (2) The Tasks of Party Consolidation
- (3) Demands on Party Members and Leading Party Cadres
- (4) Steps and Basic Methods of Party Consolidation
- (5) Organizational Measures and Registration of Party Members
- (6) Guards Against Perfunctoriness
- (7) The Leadership of Party Consolidation
- (8) Consolidate and Develop the Achievements of Party Consolidation
- (9) Party Organizations at Various Levels Must Resolutely and Creatively Implement This Decision

Appended to the "Decision" text is a Beijing Review reference note on articles of the CCP Constitution cited in the "Decision" (pp. XI-XII). A Chinese-language version of the "Decision" appeared in Hongqi, no. 20, [16 October] 1983, pp. 3-17.

The Decision of the Central Committee Of the Communist Party of China On Party Consolidation

**—Adopted by the Second Plenary Session of the 12th
Party Central Committee**

(October 11, 1983)

The 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China has decided on an overall rectification of Party style and a consolidation of Party organizations over a period of three years beginning in the latter half of 1983. The Second Plenary Session of the 12th Party Central Committee has discussed the question of how to carry out this important decision and decided that the overall consolidation of the Party should begin in winter this year.

(1) The Necessity and Urgency of Party Consolidation

Ours is a long-tested, great Marxist Party. In spite of the serious damage sustained by our Party in the 10-year domestic turmoil, the ranks of our Party remain, on the whole, politically pure and highly militant. Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee, our Party has reaffirmed the Marxist line, accomplished a shift of the focus of work of the Party and state, launched the socialist modernization drive with economic construction as the central task, handled in an appropriate manner many major issues left over from the past, systematically summed up the historical experience gained since the founding of the People's Republic, restructured the government organizations and readjusted the leading bodies at all levels, strengthened the building of socialist democracy and legal system, waged struggles to combat grave criminal activities in the economic sphere and other serious crimes and

to rectify various acts detrimental to the interests of the state and the people, and conducted education in reviving and promoting the fine traditions of the Party and in socialist and communist ideology. As a result of such work and struggles, initial success has been achieved in rectifying Party style and consolidating the Party organizations, the situation in the Party has noticeably improved, and the healthy force has gained the dominant position in the Party. This abundantly proves that our Party, by relying on its own strength, is fully capable of overcoming its seamy side, of correcting its mistakes, and of forging ahead with greater vigour.

However, while carrying out the intense work and struggles mentioned above in the last few years, our Party did not have the time to carry on an overall and systematic rectification of the many problems existing in the spheres of ideology, style of work and organization of the Party. Education among the Party members has been neither widespread nor adequate. The pernicious influence of the 10-year domestic turmoil has not been eradicated. It is entirely correct that we have adopted the policy of opening to the outside world and enlivening the national economy. But, under the new historical conditions, there has been an increase in the corrosive influence of decadent bourgeois ideology and remnant feudal ideas, while the work and struggles we have undertaken to resist and overcome such corrosive influence have not been effective enough. For these

reasons, there are still many serious problems in the Party. Some Party members lack a correct understanding of the great significance of setting things to rights and have not shifted their stand on to the Marxist line; other members have a vague and confused idea about the basic principles and superiority of the socialist system and about the bright communist future. On the ideological front, some members turn a blind eye to anti-Marxist and anti-socialist ideas, and some even openly spread these ideas. Some Party members and cadres have succumbed to individualism in a serious way. Seeking to advance personal interests and the interests of a small group, they have unscrupulously resorted to all means to harm the interests of the state and the people and embarked on the road of committing crimes. A number of Party members and cadres have a very weak sense of organization, are lax in discipline, and are listless and inert, failing to play an exemplary vanguard role. Some Party organizations are soft, weak and lax, or are even in a state of paralysis, failing to play their role as fighting bastions. The Party has not yet cleared its ranks of three types of persons, namely, persons who rose to prominence by following the counter-revolutionary cliques of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing in "rebellion," those who are seriously factionalist in their ideas, and those who indulged in beating, smashing and looting. Such serious impurities in ideology, style of work and organization, which are of great harm to the Party, must be resolutely and effectively dealt with.

Our Party is faced with the new historical task of carrying out socialist modernization. This is a great, glorious and yet extremely arduous task. The strong leadership of the Communist Party is indispensable to the socialist cause. The Party Central Committee pointed out long ago that it is essential to uphold and also to improve Party leadership. Today, in addition to the serious impurities in ideology, style of work and organization as mentioned above, there are many other aspects in our Party which do not conform to the needs of the new situation and new tasks facing us. The general aim and requirements of the present Party consolidation are, under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and by relying on the revolutionary consciousness of all comrades in the Party, correctly using the sharp weapons of criticism and self-criticism and enforcing Party discipline, to expose and deal with manifestations of the serious impurities that exist in the Party in ideology, style of work and organi-

zation, so as to bring about a fundamental turn for the better in the style of the Party, raise the ideological level of the whole Party and the level of its work, strengthen the ties between the Party and the masses of the people, and strive to build the Party and make it a strong core of leadership for the cause of socialist modernization.

The present Party consolidation is a major step which our Party must take to achieve fresh great victories in the new historical period. It is a fundamental guarantee for achieving, under the precondition of constantly raising the economic results, the magnificent goal of quadrupling the nation's gross annual output value of industrial and agricultural production by the end of this century, a goal set forth at the 12th Party Congress, and it is also a fundamental guarantee for building China into a modern, culturally advanced and highly democratic socialist country.

(2) The Tasks of Party Consolidation

The Party Central Committee holds that the tasks for the present Party consolidation are the achievement of ideological unity, the rectification of the Party's style of work, the strengthening of discipline and the purification of the Party organization.

First, the achievement of ideological unity means making further efforts to bring about a high degree of ideological and political unity throughout the Party and correcting all erroneous "Left" and Right tendencies that run counter to the four basic principles and to the Party line that has been adopted since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee.

The entire history of our Party shows that maintaining a high degree of ideological and political unity is a basic condition to winning victory in revolution and construction. The line, principles and basic policies of the Party since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee have been worked out by combining the four basic principles with the concrete practice under the present historical conditions, through the process of correcting "Left" errors and combating Right mistakes, and in compliance with the requirements of socialist modernization. Proven correct in practice, they have won the wholehearted support of the masses of Party members and cadres. All Party organizations and members must maintain unity with the Central Committee on the basis of persisting in the

four basic principles and in the Party line adopted since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee. This is required by the Party's political discipline. Whether a Party organization or Party member can do this constitutes the main criterion for judging the ideological and political soundness and the sense of discipline of that Party organization or member.

On this question, there are now two erroneous tendencies in the Party. One is that a number of Party members and cadres who have not yet freed themselves from the shackles of past "Left" ideas distort the four basic principles and assume a resisting attitude towards the Party line, principles and basic policies adopted since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee; some even feign compliance while covertly opposing the Party line, principles and policies or openly refuse to carry them out. The other tendency is that some Party members and cadres, who have failed to stand the test of historical setbacks and succumbed to the corrosive influence of bourgeois ideology, doubt and negate the four basic principles, deviate from the Party line, principles and basic policies adopted since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee, and propagate bourgeois liberalization. Both these erroneous "Left" and Right tendencies are incompatible with the character and programme and historic mission of the Party.

Most of those who have committed such mistakes have done so because of their ideology and understanding, and they should be helped to deepen their understanding and correct their mistakes by studying and summarizing the historical experience and through patient criticism and education. As for the few who persist in their wrong political stand and refuse to correct their mistakes, they should be seriously criticized and ideological struggles should be carried out against them; in addition, due disciplinary action should be taken against them.

To maintain political unity with the Party Central Committee does not mean professing unity in words alone, but everyone must uphold unity in deeds. It is essential to resolutely change the state of flabbiness in ideological-political work, to correctly and willingly carry out the line, principles and policies of the Party Central Committee, and to resolutely resist and overcome the influence of erroneous "Left" and Right tendencies.

To maintain political unity with the Party Central Committee, one must integrate the line, principles and policies of the Party Central Com-

mittee with the actual conditions of one's locality, department or unit; one must also bring into full play one's own initiative and creativity and work in an independent and responsible way. It is essential to overcome subjectivism, conduct careful investigation and study, proceed from reality and seek truth from facts in all matters, and combine revolutionary vigour with scientific approach. Only thus can we ensure that the line, principles and policies of the Party Central Committee be correctly carried out, and only thus can we continuously enrich and develop them with the new experience gained in practice and carry the cause of the Party forward.

Second, rectifying the Party style means promoting the revolutionary spirit of serving the people wholeheartedly, checking various acts of seeking personal gains by taking advantage of one's power and position, and opposing the bureaucratic attitude of not holding oneself responsible to the Party and people.

Our Party has no particular interest of its own other than the interests of the working class and the masses of the people. For more than half a century, our Party has continuously achieved successes in the revolution and in construction precisely because it has by its deeds demonstrated its selfless character and the spirit of serving the people wholeheartedly, thereby winning the people's sincere love and trust. During the years of revolutionary wars, the Party would not have been able to hold its ground and avert defeat if it had not worked for the interests of the masses, won them over, relied on them and obtained their full support. This is easy for our comrades to understand. However, in the long years since our Party took over the political power of the whole country, quite a number of our comrades have become unclear in their thinking about such necessity. They fail to understand that the question of the Party's style is a question of life and death for a party in power. Because the Party's position has changed, all its activities concern the interests of the people and the destiny of the country; if it is divorced from the masses and does not take resolute measures to correct it, then the Party will inevitably lose the people's trust and support and will meet with failure.

Now, some Party members and cadres have totally forgotten the basic principle of serving the people wholeheartedly. They are not correctly using the power and working conditions given them by the Party and the people to work for the welfare of the masses, but are seeking personal gains by every possible means for them-

selves and for those close to them. They ask the Party for higher positions and better treatment. They openly violate financial regulations and discipline, sabotage state plans, violate state economic policies and illegally retain taxes and profits; they invent all sorts of pretexts to squander, waste and occupy state and collective funds and property. With regard to the distribution of housing, the increase in wages and many other matters—such as the employment, education, promotion, job assignments and changing from rural residence registration to urban residence registration for their children, relatives and friends as well as foreign affairs work—they take advantage of their power and position, conveniences provided by their work and personal relations to seek special privileges, violate the law and discipline, and encroach upon the interests of the state and the masses. They ignore the law, protect and shield criminals, and they even take a direct part in unlawful activities, such as smuggling, selling smuggled goods, corruption, accepting bribes and profiteering.

Some Party cadres in leading positions are seriously affected by bureaucratism; their revolutionary will has been waning, eating three full meals a day yet doing no work. They pay no attention at all to the weal and woe of the people; they are unconcerned about the expansion of production, the reform of government structure and the development of socialist ethics and culture; and they argue back and forth, trying to shift the responsibility on to others and even counteracting each other's efforts in their work. Their serious neglect of duty has caused horrifying waste in the country's production and construction, serious errors in state administration and huge economic and political losses for the Party and government.

These unhealthy tendencies and decadent phenomena, which are seriously sabotaging the nation's socialist modernization, have greatly impaired our Party's image among the people, weakened the confidence of the Party members and the masses in the superiority of the socialist system and the bright future of communism, and dampened their enthusiasm for politics, production, work and study. We must be resolved to solve this problem in the present Party consolidation and resolutely eradicate these unhealthy tendencies. Party members and cadres who took advantage of their power, position and other conveniences to seek personal gains after the Party Central Committee promulgated the Rules of Conduct for Inner-Party Political Life in March 1980 should be required to make

self-criticisms. Those who have committed grave mistakes should be dealt with according to Party discipline and administrative discipline, and those who have violated the law should be punished according to law. Those who have profited at the government's expense should, on the basis of thorough investigations and on the merit of each case, be required to return what they had unlawfully taken or pay compensations. Those who committed such mistakes before the promulgation of the Rules of Conduct should also be handled in all seriousness if their mistakes are particularly serious or if they refuse to mend their ways. Necessary disciplinary action should also be taken against bureaucrats who have neglected their duties with serious consequences, and some should be dismissed from the leading posts or expelled from the Party.

Third, the strengthening of discipline is to adhere to the Party's organizational principle of democratic centralism, oppose the patriarchal system, factionalism, anarchism and liberalism which completely ignore Party organizations and discipline, and correct the softness, weakness and laxness of the Party organizations.

To maintain the Party's strict organizational discipline and uphold democratic centralism is an important guarantee for the realization of the Party's programme and tasks and for the strengthening of the Party's fighting capacity.

At present, the pernicious influence of the 10-year domestic turmoil has not been eradicated among a number of Party organizations and members, and violations of the Party's system of democratic centralism are rather serious. Some leading cadres place themselves above the Party organizations, where collective leadership exists in name only. In fact, only one or two individuals make the final decisions. Some of them have even turned the units under their charge into territories where their will holds sway and where they rule as overlords. In other cases, some Party members and cadres disregard the Party's organizational principle and Party discipline, and are seriously affected by anarchism, liberalism, decentralism, departmentalism and sectarianism. It should be pointed out in particular that up to now factionalism which developed during the 10-year domestic turmoil among a number of Party members and cadres has not yet been overcome. They still maintain factionalism instead of the Party spirit. They use their faction as the line of demarcation and appoint people by favouritism while elbowing out of their way those who hold different views; they form cliques to pursue selfish

interests, seriously impairing the unity and solidarity of the Party and hindering the Party from carrying out its line, principles and policies. Party activities in a number of Party organizations are far from regular, with neither criticism nor self-criticism; Party discipline is not strictly observed, and violations of Party discipline and other unhealthy tendencies are not checked and corrected. Instead of taking the lead in criticism and self-criticism and combating unhealthy tendencies, some leading cadres, abiding by the principle of giving no offence to others, evade contradictions wherever possible, while others suppress criticism and retaliate against those who criticize them. These phenomena must be done away with completely during the present consolidation of the Party. After the Party consolidation, criticism and self-criticism should become an established practice in the Party organizations, especially within the leading bodies, so as to bring about a vigorous and lively situation in which there are both democracy and centralism, unity and strict discipline.

Fourth, to purify the Party organizations means to sort out elements who persist in opposing and harming the Party, and expel them from the Party in accordance with the Party Constitution.

Purifying the Party organizations is a major purpose of the present consolidation of the Party. Since the three types of persons oppose and harm the Party, they are bound to be a hidden peril if they are not thoroughly sorted out and expelled. To sort out and expel the three types of persons is of crucial importance in our effort to purify the Party organizations. The first type, those who rose to prominence during the "cultural revolution," refers to those persons who closely followed Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and their ilk, formed factions and cliques, seized political power in "rebellion," rose to high positions, and committed evil with serious consequences. The second type, those who are seriously factionalist in their ideas, refers to those who in the "cultural revolution" period vigorously publicized the reactionary ideology of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques, and formed cliques for doing evil. After the downfall of the "gang of four," they have continued, either openly or covertly, with their factionalist activities. The third type, those who indulged in beating, smashing and looting during the "cultural revolution" period, refers to those who during the "cultural revolution" framed and persecuted cadres and the masses, extorted confessions by torture, and

seriously ruined their victims' health; it also refers to those chief elements and those behind the scenes responsible for the smashing of institutions, the seizure of files by force and the damaging of both public and private property; it also refers to those who plotted, organized and directed violent confrontations which resulted in serious consequences. The basis for distinguishing whether a person belongs to the three types of persons is the damage done to the Party and the people and not the title or membership in a particular faction during the "cultural revolution." A serious and prudent attitude should be taken in determining whether a person belongs to any of the three types, and his performance during the "cultural revolution" should be analysed from a historical point of view. Wherever and whenever controversy arises, it should be submitted to the Party committee at the higher level for discussion and decision. In principle, the three types of persons should be expelled from the Party, except those who have proved to have really mended their ways after a long period of examination.

With the exception of the three types of persons mentioned above, the principle of dealing with different cases in different ways will be applied to Party members and leading Party cadres who made mistakes or had other problems during the "cultural revolution." Mistakes of a general character will not be brought up again during this Party consolidation. As for those who committed serious mistakes but conclusions have not yet been drawn and they have not been dealt with, conclusions will be drawn and due measures taken during this Party consolidation; as for those who have already received a judgment and have been dealt with, their cases will not be considered again this time if no new major problems have been discovered.

Those who stubbornly resist the policies of the Party Central Committee adopted since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee, those who have committed grave crimes in economic matters and other criminal offences, and those who have seriously violated the law and discipline must all be expelled from the Party.

For those who are expelled, appropriate arrangements should be made in work for those who are still fit to be cadres; those unfit to be cadres should be provided with opportunities to find jobs and earn a living. Ideological help and political concern should be shown them, and they should be encouraged and helped to remould their ideology and make progress.

(3) Demands on Party Members and Leading Party Cadres

The Party Central Committee requires that all Party members take an active part in the Party consolidation without exception. The broad masses of Party members should strive to enhance their communist consciousness and strengthen their Party spirit so that they will become qualified members and then make still greater efforts to become outstanding members of the Party. The criteria of a qualified member are the basic demands set by Article 2 and the eight duties prescribed by Article 3 of the Party Constitution.

The leading Party cadres at all levels should shoulder particularly important responsibilities in the political life of the Party and the state and in the implementation of the Party's line, principles and policies. In addition to meeting the requirements of Party members mentioned above, they must meet the six basic requirements prescribed by Article 35 of the Party Constitution. At present, it is particularly important for them to enhance their understanding of the theories of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and the policies based on them, raise their sense of dedication to the revolutionary cause and their sense of political responsibility, dare to combat all hostile forces disrupting socialism, fight against decadent bourgeois ideology, against acts of creating spiritual pollution and against the abuse of power and position for personal gains so that they will set a good example for the broad masses of Party members and guide the masses to make efforts to become people with high ideals and morality, cultural knowledge and sense of discipline.

The broad masses of young Party members are distinguished for their lively thinking, their courage to blaze new trails and their vigour and vitality. However, the majority of them know little about the basic theories of Marxism and the fundamental knowledge concerning the Party; they lack experience in revolutionary practice and in inner-Party political life. Because they were ideologically influenced by anarchism and other passive phenomena during the 10-year domestic turmoil when their world outlook was taking shape, their ability to correctly distinguish between right and wrong with regard to political affairs is, generally speaking, fairly poor. During this Party consolidation, close attention should be paid to enhancing their ideological and political consciousness, strengthening their Party spirit and raising their ability to resist the corrosive influence of bour-

geois ideology so that they will mature as quickly as possible and become capable of really shouldering their historic task as successors to the Party's cause.

As far as the broad masses of Party members are concerned, in judging whether they conform to the standard set by the Party Constitution, the emphasis is on their concrete actions in all aspects since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee.

(4) Steps and Basic Methods of Party Consolidation

The present Party consolidation will be carried out according to the following steps: It will proceed from the central level to the grassroots organizations, from the top downwards by stages and in groups. Rectification of the Party organization of each unit should also proceed from the top downwards in the order of the leading bodies, leading cadres and ordinary Party members.

The Party now has 40 million members, including more than 9 million cadres, and about 2.5 million Party organizations at the grassroots level and above. Party consolidation will be completed in three years, beginning in this winter, in two stages. During the first stage, beginning in winter this year, the work will be the consolidation of Party organizations of the leading bodies at the central level and at the provincial, municipal and autonomous regional level (including the Party organizations of the various ministries, commissions and offices, departments and bureaux of these two levels) and the Party organizations in the leading bodies of all the general headquarters, services and arms and great military areas of the People's Liberation Army. During this period, the provincial, municipal and autonomous regional Party committees may designate some Party organizations at the prefectural and county levels which have already completed structural reforms to carry out Party consolidation as pilot cases. Similar experiments may also be conducted in the army. In the second stage, beginning in winter 1984, all the remaining Party organizations will be consolidated, and the various provincial, municipal and autonomous regional Party committees and the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army may make concrete arrangements, in accordance with their actual conditions, on the ways of carrying out the work by groups during this stage.

After this decision is released, all the Party organizations should organize their members to

seriously study the documents on Party consolidation decided upon by the Party Central Committee in order to enhance their ideological consciousness and put the regular activities of the Party organizations on a sound basis. Party members and Party cadres who have committed various kinds of mistakes should take the initiative to correct their mistakes and should not wait until Party consolidation begins in their respective units.

The basic methods of the present Party consolidation are, on the basis of a careful study of documents and enhancement of ideology and understanding, to make criticism and self-criticism, distinguish between right and wrong, correct mistakes and purify the Party organization. In the process of Party consolidation, ideological education should be strengthened from beginning to end so as to raise the ideological consciousness of the broad masses of Party members.

To meet the needs of Party consolidation, the Party Central Committee has decided to edit and publish *A Must Book for Party Members*, *A Concise Edition of Important Documents Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee*, *Comrade Mao Zedong on the Party's Style of Work and Party Organization*. These three books and the *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping* will be the documents for study during this Party consolidation. For Party members who lack the ability to read, the Party committees at and above the county level will be responsible for organizing and training people to read and explain to them the main contents of *A Must Book for Party Members* and the *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. All Party members must, through the study of these Party consolidation documents, raise their understanding of the character, programme and task of the Party, and raise their understanding of the criteria for Party members and of the line, principles and policies of the Party since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee. The Party organizations of the leading bodies at the central and provincial, municipal and autonomous regional levels should, after the completion of Party consolidation in their own units, organize Party cadres to earnestly study some basic Marxist works. (A list of books will be decided later.) Other Party organizations should also organize their Party cadres to study these books after Party consolidation in their units is completed.

To study the documents and raise understanding is to create the necessary conditions for solving contradictions within the Party,

while correctly carrying out criticism and self-criticism is an effective method to solve these contradictions. Without conscientious criticism and self-criticism, none of the aims of Party consolidation can be achieved. Not daring to criticize and fight against erroneous ideas and acts within the Party is a manifestation of impurity in Party spirit; suppressing criticism and retaliating against people who have made criticisms is abominable behaviour which violates Party discipline. While making criticism and self-criticism, we must strictly follow the principles consistently stressed by our Party and Comrade Mao Zedong: We must proceed from the desire for unity, help those who are criticized, and act in the spirit of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient"; we must be practical and base our criticism on facts and we should allow the people concerned to defend their cases; we must keep to the truth and not spare the feelings of those who are criticized; we must combine the seriousness and acuteness of criticism and self-criticism with a scientific attitude and attain the goal of clearing up ideology, correcting mistakes and uniting with our comrades to make common progress.

The mass line must be followed in the present Party consolidation. First of all, we should take full heed of the opinions of the masses of Party members and Party organizations at the lower levels and give full play to the positive role of the Party members in consolidating the Party. In the meantime, we should also fully heed the opinions of non-Party members. We should actively consider and accept all correct opinions, and give explanations if the opinions put forward are wrong. All the problems arising in the course of Party consolidation should be solved through discussions by the related Party organizations. On no account should the past erroneous practice of "letting the masses consolidate the Party" or letting non-Party members decide issues in the Party be repeated.

In the process of consolidating the Party organizations, we should resolutely and promptly solve all problems which can be solved immediately so that people both inside the Party and out can see in good time the actual results of the Party consolidation.

The production and work of all units should not be disrupted by the work of Party consolidation. While doing a good job in the Party consolidation, all units should strive to promote production and work.

The Communist Youth League, which is the Party's assistant and reserve force, should or-

ganize its members to study the documents on Party consolidation so as to raise their ideological and political levels.

The Party consolidation is aimed solely at solving the problems within our Party. The various democratic parties, therefore, are not required to rectify their style of work or readjust their organizations.

(5) Organizational Measures and Registration of Party Members

Organizational measures towards Party members should, generally speaking, be taken in the latter period of the Party consolidation.

For Party members who have committed minor errors, the stress is placed on criticism and education, and they are required to correct their mistakes in an earnest way. For Party members who have made grave mistakes, due disciplinary action should be taken towards them, in addition to criticism and education. Party members who have violated administrative discipline should be dealt with by the administrative departments according to administrative discipline; those who have violated the state law should be dealt with by the judicial organs according to law. If we fail to resolutely punish Party members who deserve punishment, or if we fail to resolutely expel members who should be expelled from the Party, we will not be able to maintain the solemnity of Party discipline and purify the Party organizations, and this will inevitably affect our Party's fighting power.

When taking organizational measures towards Party members, we should uphold the principle of seeking the truth from facts and strictly abide by the procedures prescribed in the Party Constitution. No ratios or quotas whatsoever should be fixed beforehand in this regard.

After rectifying ideological and organizational matters and work style, and after handling issues that should be handled, every Party organization should finally carry out, in a prudent way, the registration of Party members.

(a) Party members who are up to, or basically up to, the requirements for Party membership are allowed to register.

(b) Party members who are still basically not up to the requirements after education, but who have expressed the determination and have through their deeds shown that they are willing to mend their ways and to be tested by the Party, may have their registration postponed for no longer than two years. Registration of Party members who have been placed on proba-

tion within the Party as a disciplinary measure should also be postponed.

(c) Party members whose revolutionary will has waned, who do not honour their obligations as Party members, who cannot live up to the requirements for Party membership, or who refuse to repent despite repeated help and education should be persuaded to withdraw from the Party and should not be allowed to register.

(d) Party members who request to quit the Party, or those who have already given up their memberships and refuse to participate in the Party consolidation should have their names removed from the Party and should not be allowed to register.

Whether a Party member should be allowed to register or not or whether his registration should be postponed should be discussed and decided upon at the meeting of all members of the Party branch. The names of Party members whose registration is to be postponed or who are to be refused registration should be submitted to the Party organization at the higher level for approval. Party members whose registration is postponed do not have the right to vote, elect or be elected. Party members who have met the requirements for membership by the time the period of postponement expires should be allowed to register, and those who fail to meet the requirements should have their names removed from the Party.

Conscientious ideological and political work should be done among Party members whose registration has been postponed so as to help them pull themselves together and strive to make progress and become qualified Party members as quickly as possible. Solicitude should also be shown, ideologically and politically, to those who have been refused registration; they should be united with and encouraged to be good citizens or good cadres.

(6) Guard Against Perfunctoriness

Leading Party cadres at all levels, especially the high-ranking cadres, should play a truly exemplary role in guarding against perfunctoriness in the work of consolidating the Party organizations. Leading cadres of every Party organization should actively participate in the Party consolidation as ordinary members. They should be strict in analysing themselves and be courageous in making sincere, profound and realistic self-criticisms of their own mistakes and shortcomings; and they should also dare to use the same attitude in criticizing other leading cadres' mistakes and shortcomings. In this way

they will be able to lead the masses of Party members to make Party consolidation a success.

To prevent the Party consolidation from proceeding perfunctorily, it is also necessary for the Party organization at the higher level to supervise its subordinate organizations and vice versa. The Party organization at the higher level should strengthen its leadership over its subordinate organizations and strictly supervise their work of Party consolidation, as well as study and help solve in good time their problems arising in the course of the Party consolidation. Every Party member should play a supervisory role and actively report, with a high sense of responsibility, problems in the Party consolidation of his own unit to the Party organization of his unit or to the Party committee at the higher level. The main leading members of every Party organization should be held responsible for the success or failure of consolidating their own organization, and the Party committee at the higher level should also assume responsibility. The Party organization at the higher level should promptly inform its subordinate organizations of the situation in its own consolidation, so that they can exercise supervision and put forward their criticisms.

To guard against perfunctoriness in the Party consolidation, the Party committee at the higher level should organize acceptance tests whenever a subordinate organization has finished its consolidation work. Such acceptance tests should have the participation of representatives of the Party members and should proceed by fully soliciting the opinions of the masses of Party members. The standards for the acceptance tests are as follows:

(a) Can the leading body correctly implement the Party's line, principles and policies and maintain political unity with the Party Central Committee and has it become a united and strong leading core?

(b) Have stern measures been taken against anti-Party elements and those who have brought damage to the Party, especially the three types of persons?

(c) Have the problems much criticized inside and outside the Party been earnestly solved, especially the problem of taking advantage of one's position, power and other conveniences to seek personal gains?

(d) Has the Party members' political quality been raised? Have they heightened their sense of organization and discipline, and are they capable of conscientiously implementing the Party Constitution and actively playing an exemplary vanguard role? Have the primary

Party organizations given full play to their role as fighting bastions and have they strengthened their ties with the masses?

(e) Has noticeable progress been achieved in the production and work under the charge of the Party organization concerned?

Resolute remedial measures should be taken whenever a Party organization is found to have failed to fulfil any of these five requirements. The consolidation of Party organizations conducted on a trial basis before the announcement of this decision should be recognized as valid if they pass the acceptance tests and are found to be up to the five requirements mentioned above. But those Party organizations which are not up to the requirements should make up for what they lack.

While preventing the Party consolidation from proceeding perfunctorily, attention should be paid to guard against the erroneous practice of the past of ruthless struggle and merciless attack. It is absolutely impermissible for anyone to take advantage of the Party consolidation to whip up factionalism, to use factionalism to persecute others, to make false charges or to retaliate against others against whom he bears a grudge. Anyone who commits any of these offences will be duly punished.

(7) The Leadership of Party Consolidation

The Party Central Committee has decided to establish a Central Commission for Guiding Party Consolidation and to set up competent administrative bodies. The commission will function under the leadership of the Party Central Committee and its main tasks include keeping abreast of the situation, firmly grasping the Party's policies, supervising and checking up on work, giving guidance and doing publicity work. In the course of Party consolidation, the commission will issue in succession various supplementary stipulations and issue in good time circulars on important matters, problems and experiences concerning Party consolidation so as to ensure the implementation of the decision made by the Party Central Committee on Party consolidation.

In accordance with the plan of the Party Central Committee, the Party committees of the various provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions will complete the reform of organizations at the county and commune (township) levels in 1984 so as to facilitate the work of Party consolidation at these two levels.

The present Party consolidation will be conducted under the leadership of the Party

organizations of the respective localities, departments and units, and the Party organization at the higher level should have a clear knowledge of whether the leading bodies of the Party organizations at the lower levels have any serious problems. In the course of Party consolidation, the higher Party organization will, generally speaking, not send any work groups. For those units, where the situation is complicated and problems are serious and where the leading bodies are not in a position to take upon themselves the task of Party consolidation and therefore work groups must be sent by the higher Party organizations, the work groups should be headed by responsible cadres of the higher Party organizations. Their task is to help reshuffle the leading bodies, after which the leading bodies that have thus been set up will lead the work of Party consolidation.

The Party committees at and above the county level should select a number of comrades who are strong in Party spirit and good in their style of work and who have a deep knowledge of the Party's ideological and organizational work, including veteran comrades who have retired from work in the "front line." These comrades will be sent, after study and training in the work of Party consolidation, to the subordinate units as liaison men or inspectors. Their main task is to gain a better understanding of the situation, have a firm grasp of the trends, heed the opinions of the people from various quarters, report in good time to the local Party organizations and higher Party committees and put forward proposals.

The task of the present Party consolidation is a very arduous one. The major responsible comrades of the Party committees at all levels should, therefore, go deep into the realities, strengthen their investigations and studies, personally lead the work at one or two selected spots to get first-hand material, sum up and popularize in good time the typical experience gained in the work of Party consolidation. They should dare to take up and cope with the problems cropping up during the Party consolidation, and they should dare to tackle hard and difficult cases and correct errors in good time.

(8) Consolidate and Develop the Achievements of Party Consolidation

In the later stage of Party consolidation, efforts should be made by Party organizations at all levels to consolidate and develop the achievements of Party consolidation through ideological education, the institution of appropriate systems

and organizational building so that the work of Party building will be pushed forward further.

After this Party consolidation, we should strengthen our daily ideological and political work among Party members. Ideological and political education among Party members should be regular and systematized. We should, in the light of the actual conditions of the Party organizations and the practice in China's socialist modernization, carry out systematic education among Party members in the basic theories of Marxism, in the essential knowledge and fine traditions of the Party and in the Party's principles and policies. We should also carry out education among Party members in the socialist legal system and in scientific and cultural knowledge which is indispensable to the modernization drive.

After this Party consolidation, we should strive to establish the various necessary systems to improve and reform life within the Party. Regular activities of Party organizations should be further improved so that Party members and cadres will in this way receive rigorous training and the effective supervision of the Party organizations. The struggle against the decadent ideology of the bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes will be a protracted one and comrades throughout the Party should on no account relax their vigilance.

During and after the consolidation of the Party, attention should be paid to admitting into the Party outstanding people who are willing to dedicate themselves to the socialist and communist cause. In view of the fact that there are only a small number of Party members in the forefront of industrial production and in transport and communications, finance and trade and only a small number of Party members among the young peasants and students, that a number of intellectuals who are already up to the requirements for Party membership have not been admitted into the Party, and that there are not many women or members of the minority nationalities in the Party, the stress of recruiting new Party members at present should be laid on the workers and staff members working in the front line of industry, transport and communications, finance and trade, young peasants, PLA soldiers and officers, intellectuals in all trades and professions and students in the universities and colleges and secondary technical schools. Greater attention should be paid to recruiting women and people of minority nationalities as Party members. In recruiting new Party members, it is necessary to adhere to the requirements for Party member-

ship and ensure the quality of the Party members. We must see to it that anyone who has met the requirements should be admitted accordingly. Closed-doorism should be avoided and hasty admission into the Party without going through the necessary procedures is forbidden.

(9) Party Organizations at Various Levels Must Resolutely and Creatively Implement This Decision

This decision has put forward the basic principles, tasks, policies and methods for the present Party consolidation. Party organizations in the various places, departments and units should combine these principles, policies and methods with their actual conditions and draw up concrete plans for implementation. While faithfully following the various stipulations in the decision, they should creatively implement them. With regard to the four tasks listed in the decision for the present Party consolidation, Party organizations in the various places, departments and units may put the emphasis on certain aspects in the light of their actual conditions. Party committees at various levels should see to it that the present Party consolidation should not under any circumstance obstruct the continuous implementation of the Party's various principles and policies on opening to the outside world and enlivening the domestic economy.

In the long years of revolutionary struggle, our Party has fostered the fine tradition of strengthening Party building mainly through ideological education. Now our Party has had the negative experience of the "Left" mistakes committed in the 10-year domestic turmoil and before then; it also has had the positive experience of successfully setting things to rights since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee, and it has a complete series of correct principles and policies for Party consolidation. Moreover, it has a large number of long-tested loyal proletarian fighters as the mainstay in the present Party consolidation, and the majority of the Party organizations and Party members are good or fairly good, while the broad masses of people actively support our work in consolidating the Party. With these conditions and through the concerted efforts of the Party organizations at various levels and the Party members, our Party will surely carry forward its fine traditions and successfully fulfil the tasks of the present Party consolidation.

The Party Central Committee believes that this Party consolidation is certain to raise the

level of Marxism of the whole Party, enable the Party to brim with still greater vitality and vigour, and bring about a new atmosphere of working with a will to make the country strong and close unity throughout the Party. If the Yanan rectification movement in 1942 enabled the Party to achieve a high degree of unity in thinking, guaranteed victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan and the War of Liberation, and led to the founding of the People's Republic of China, the present Party consolidation will certainly enable our Party to provide better leadership for the people of all nationalities throughout the country to win great victories in the socialist modernization drive.

For your reference

Articles 2, 3, 4 and 35 Of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China

Article 2 Members of the Communist Party of China are vanguard fighters of the Chinese working class imbued with communist consciousness.

Members of the Communist Party of China must serve the people wholeheartedly, dedicate their whole lives to the realization of communism, and be ready to make any personal sacrifices.

Members of the Communist Party of China are at all times ordinary members of the working people. Communist Party members must not seek personal gain or privileges, although they are allowed personal benefits and job functions and powers as provided for by the relevant regulations and policies.

Article 3 Party members must fulfil the following duties:

(1) To conscientiously study Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, essential knowledge concerning the Party, and the Party's line, principles, policies and decisions; and acquire general, scientific and professional knowledge.

(2) To adhere to the principle that the interests of the Party and the people stand above everything, subordinate their personal interests to the interests of the Party and the people, be the first to bear hardships and the last to enjoy comforts, work selflessly for the public interest, and absolutely never use public office for personal gain or benefit themselves at the expense of the public.

(3) To execute the Party's decisions perse-

veringly, accept any job and fulfil actively any task assigned them by the Party, conscientiously observe Party discipline and the laws of the state, rigorously guard Party and state secrets and staunchly defend the interests of the Party and the state.

(4) To uphold the Party's solidarity and unity, to firmly oppose factionalism and all factional organizations and small-group activities, and to oppose double-dealing and scheming of any kind.

(5) To be loyal to and honest with the Party, to match words with deeds and not to conceal their political views or distort facts; to earnestly practise criticism and self-criticism, to be bold in exposing and correcting shortcomings and mistakes in work, backing good people and good deeds and fighting against bad people and bad deeds.

(6) To maintain close ties with the masses, propagate the Party's views among them, consult with them when problems arise, listen to their views and demands with an open mind and keep the Party informed of these in good time, help them raise their political consciousness, and defend their legitimate rights and interests.

(7) To play an exemplary vanguard role in production and other work, study and social activities, take the lead in maintaining public order, promote new socialist ways and customs and advocate communist ethics.

(8) As required by the defence of the motherland and the interests of the people, to step forward and fight bravely in times of difficulty and danger, fearing neither hardship nor death.

Article 4 Party members enjoy the following rights:

(1) To attend pertinent Party meetings and read pertinent Party documents, and to benefit from the Party's education and training.

(2) To participate in the discussion, at Party meetings and in Party newspapers and journals, of questions concerning the Party's policies.

(3) To make suggestions and proposals regarding the work of the Party.

(4) To make well-grounded criticism of any Party organization or member at Party meetings; to present information or charges against any Party organization or member concerning violations of discipline and of the law to the Party in a responsible way, and to demand disciplinary measures against such a member, or to demand the dismissal or replacement of any cadre who is incompetent.

(5) To vote, elect and stand for election.

(6) To attend, with the right of self-defence, discussions held by Party organizations to decide on disciplinary measures to be taken against themselves or to appraise their work and behaviour, while other Party members may also bear witness or argue on their behalf.

(7) In case of disagreement with a Party decision or policy, to make reservations and present their views to Party organizations at higher levels up to and including the Central Committee, provided that they resolutely carry out the decision or policy while it is in force.

(8) To put forward any request, appeal or complaint to higher Party organizations up to and including the Central Committee and ask the organizations concerned for a responsible reply.

No Party organization, up to and including the Central Committee, has the right to deprive any Party member of the above-mentioned rights.

Article 35 Leading Party cadres at all levels must perform in an exemplary way their duties as Party members prescribed in Article 3 of this Constitution and must meet the following basic requirements:

(1) Have a fair grasp of the theories of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and the policies based on them, and be able to adhere to the socialist road, fight against the hostile forces disrupting socialism and combat all erroneous tendencies inside and outside the Party.

(2) In their work as leaders, conduct earnest investigations and study, persistently proceed from reality and properly carry out the line, principles and policies of the Party.

(3) Be fervently dedicated to the revolutionary cause and imbued with a strong sense of political responsibility, and be qualified for their leading posts in organizational ability, general education and vocational knowledge.

(4) Have a democratic work style, maintain close ties with the masses, correctly implement the Party's mass line, conscientiously accept criticism and supervision by the Party and the masses, and combat bureaucracy.

(5) Exercise their functions and powers in the proper way, observe and uphold the rules and regulations of the Party and the state, and combat all acts of abusing power and seeking personal gain.

(6) Be good at uniting and working with a large number of comrades, including those who hold differing opinions, while upholding the Party's principles. □

China is determined to recover its sovereignty, including administration, over Xianggang. This cannot be negotiated. In addition, as a sovereign state, China has every right to recover at any time its sovereignty over that part of its territory. China has expressed its willingness to solve the Xianggang question through negotiations with Britain, mainly because it has taken into consideration its friendly relations with the United Kingdom. This does not mean there is room to bargain over the issue of sovereignty. If Britain interprets China's sincere desire for and co-operative attitude towards an appropriate and reasonable solution as a sign of weakness, and stubbornly clings to its erroneous stand on the Xianggang issue, China of course cannot wait for long, still less indefinitely. It will have to announce at an appropriate time its policies towards Xianggang. Making a fuss over "deadlines" and uttering all kinds of threats, Mr. Luce obviously has underestimated the determination of the Chinese Government and people to recover sovereignty and administrative power over Xianggang. He has also revealed the intention of Britain, which has occupied Xianggang for so long, to continue that occupation. Mr. Luce should know that it is meaningless to threaten the Chinese Government and people with words or other means. If Britain persists in its colonialist stand, and thus causes the talks to unfortunately fail, the British Government will be held responsible for all the consequences.

Mr. Luce claimed that Britain stands for a "solution acceptable to the people of Xianggang, the British Parliament and the Chinese Government." This represents an attempt to turn the Xianggang issue, which should be solved by China and Britain, into one to be solved by China, Britain and Xianggang. He has also posed himself as a representative of the Xianggang people, and flaunted the banner of "representing the popular desire in Xianggang." Mr. Luce's argument does not hold water. The essence of the Xianggang issue is that Britain is occupying part of China's territory — Xianggang. The talks concerning China's recovery of Xianggang can only be conducted between China and Britain: "tripartite talks" are simply

out of the question. If the British really want to do something for the residents of Xianggang, they should adopt a co-operative attitude towards the Chinese Government and help smooth the problems in Xianggang's return to the motherland as quickly as possible.

Of the 5 million residents in Xianggang, 98 per cent are Chinese. They are our own flesh and blood. Britain has no right to represent them and cannot possibly do so. Neither do the Chinese in Xianggang think Britain can represent them. While raising the question of "popular desire," Luce and some newspapers which have been influenced by the British Government have ignored the most basic fact: The 1,000 million Chinese people, including the 5 million Xianggang residents, firmly demand Xianggang's return to China. They are determined to maintain Xianggang's prosperity and stability, and are confident that this can be done. This is the fundamental desire of the people. Any attempt to bring pressure to bear on China by raising the question of "popular desire" as a means to prevent China from recovering its territory and sovereignty is doomed to fail.

Premier Zhao Ziyang pointed out at the reception marking the 34th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic, "The Chinese Government's stand on the Xianggang issue is known to all. It is our firm and unshakable policy to resume the exercise of our sovereignty over Xianggang, while maintaining its prosperity and stability." Sino-British talks on the Xianggang issue will continue. Mr. Luce said that the British Government has begun to set its sights on long-term objectives. We would hope that instead of "setting its sights on" its own "objectives," the British would be far-sighted enough to see the changing times and adopt an attitude of good faith and co-operation. This will help both sides to find, through amiable negotiations, a quick and satisfactory solution to the issue of Xianggang's return to China, and thereby promote the friendly relations between the two countries. This alone is truly in Britain's interests.

— "Renmin Ribao" Commentator, October 6.

Appendix B

Party Consolidation Commission Leadership

- B1. Date and Place of Birth
- B2. Participation in Historical Events
- B3. Cultural Revolutionary Experience and Political Orientation
- B4. Soviet Connections
- B5. United States Connections
- B6. Current Specialization
- B7. Current Positions
- B8. Military Branch of Service

Appendix B1

Date and Place of Birth

Bo Yibo	1908	Shanxi
Chen Yeping	pre-1930	Unknown
Deng Liqun	1915	Hunan
Gan Weihai	1909	Jiangxi
Gu Dachun	pre-1930	Unknown
Guo Jian (f)	1913	Unknown
Han Guang	1912	Jilin
Hong Xuezhi	1913	Anhui
Hu Qiaomu	1912	Jiangsu
Hu Qili	1929	Shaanxi
Hu Yaobang	1915	Hunan
Huang Zhen	1908	Anhui
Jiang Nanxiang	1910	Zhejiang
Kang Keqing (f)	1910	Jiangsu
Song Renqiong	1909	Hunan
Wan Li	1916	Shandong
Wang Congwu	1905	Henan
Wang Heshou	1908	Hebei
Wang Zhaoguo	1941	Hebei
Wang Zhen	1908	Hunan
Wu Xiuquan	1908	Hubei
Xi Zhongxun	1913	Shaanxi
Yang Shangkun	1907	Sichuan
Yong Wentao	pre-1920	Guizhou
Yu Qiuli	1914	Jiangxi
Zhang Xiushan	Unknown	Unknown
Zheng Tianxiang	pre-1920	Unknown

Appendix B2

Participation in Historical Events

Bo Yibo	No known participation
Chen Yeping	No known participation
Deng Liqun	December 9th Movement
Gan Weihai	Long March (possibly) Korean War
Gu Dachun	No known participation
Guo Jian (f)	No known participation
Han Guang	No known participation
Hong Xuezhi	Long March Korean War
Hu Qiaomu	No known participation
Hu Qili	No known participation
Hu Yaobang	Autumn Harvest Uprising Long March
Huang Zhen	Long March Marshall Mission
Jiang Nanxiang	December 9th Movement
Kang Keqing (f)	Long March
Song Renqiong	Autumn Harvest Uprising Long March
Wan Li	No known participation
Wang Congwu	No known participation
Wang Heshou	No known participation
Wang Zhaoguo	No known participation
Wang Zhen	May 30th Incident Northern Expedition Long March
Wu Xiuquan	Long March Marshall Mission
Xi Zhongxun	Long March
Yang Shangkun	Long March
Yong Wentao	No known participation

Appendix B2 (Continued)

Yu Qiuli

Long March

Zhang Xiushan

No known participation

Zheng Tianxiang

No known participation

Appendix B3

Cultural Revolutionary Experience and Political Orientation

Bo Yibo	Rehabilitee (1967-78)	Chen Group
Chen Yeping	Rehabilitee (1967-78)	Deng Supporter Group
Deng Liqun	Rehabilitee (1968-75)	Deng Group
Gan Weihai	Rehabilitee (1967-72)	Unknown
Gu Dachun	Rehabilitee (1967-73)	Unknown
Guo Jian (f)	Rehabilitee (1967-77)	Unknown
Han Guang	Rehabilitee (1967-75)	Unknown
Hong Xuezhong	Rehabilitee (1959-77)	Deng Supporter Group
Hu Qiaomu	Rehabilitee (1967-74)	Deng Group
Hu Qili	Rehabilitee (1967-72)	Deng Supporter Group
Hu Yaobang	Rehabilitee (1967-72)	Deng Group
Huang Zhen	Beneficiary	Deng Supporter Group
Jiang Nanxiang	Rehabilitee (1966-74)	Deng Supporter Group
Kang Keqing (f)	Survivor	Party Elder Group
Song Renqiong	Rehabilitee (1968-74)	Deng Group
Wan Li	Rehabilitee (1966-71)	Deng Group
Wang Congwu	Rehabilitee (1967-78)	Unknown
Wang Heshou	Rehabilitee (1967-78)	Chen Group
Wang Zhaoguo	Survivor	Deng Supporter Group
Wang Zhen	Survivor	Deng Supporter Group
Wu Xiuquan	Rehabilitee (1967-74)	Deng Group
Xi Zhongxun	Rehabilitee (1962-78)	Deng Group
Yang Shangkun	Rehabilitee (1966-78)	Deng Group
Yong Wentao	Rehabilitee (1967-72)	Unknown
Yu Qiuli	Survivor	Petroleum Group
Zhang Xiushan	Unknown	Unknown
Zheng Tianxiang	Rehabilitee (1966-75)	Unknown

Appendix B4

Soviet Connections

Bo Yibo	No known connections
Chen Yeping	No known connections
Deng Liqun	No known connections
Gan Weihai	No known connections
Gu Dachun	No known connections
Guo Jian (f)	post-1949 travel (1 trip)
Han Guang	pre-1949 training pre-1949 travel contact with advisers
Hong Xuezhong	post-1949 travel (1 trip)
Hu Qiaomu	post-1949 travel (3 trips) Mbr, SSFA*
Hu Qili	No known connections
Hu Yaobang	post-1949 travel (1 trip)
Huang Zhen	contact with advisers
Jiang Nanxiang	Mbr, SSFA
Kang Keqing (f)	Mbr, SSFA
Song Renqiong	Mbr, SSFA
Wan Li	post-1949 travel (1 trip) post-1949 talks post-1982 travel (1 trip) post-1982 talks
Wang Congwu	pre-1949 travel pre-1949 training
Wang Heshou	pre-1949 training pre-1949 travel post-1949 travel (1 trip) post-1949 talks
Wang Zhaoguo	No known connections
Wang Zhen	contact with advisers (possibly)
Wu Xiuquan	pre-1949 travel pre-1949 travel post-1949 travel (6 trips) Mbr, SSFA contact with advisers (possibly) post-1949 talks

* Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.

Appendix B4 (Continued)

Xi Zhongxun	post-1949 travel (1 trip) Mbr, SSFA
Yang Shangkun	pre-1949 travel pre-1949 training post-1949 travel (3 trips) Mbr, SSFA post-1949 talks
Yong Wentao	No known connections
Yu Qiuli	No known connections
Zhang Xiushan	No known connections
Zheng Tianxiang	No known connections

Appendix B5

United States Connections

Bo Yibo	contact with observers post-1972 travel post-1972 talks
Chen Yeping	No known connections
Deng Liqun	post-1972 travel
Gan Weiha	Korean War
Gu Dachun	No known connections
Guo Jian (f)	post-1972 travel
Han Guang	No known connections
Hong Xuezhi	Korean War
Hu Qiaomu	contact with observers
Hu Qili	post-1972 travel
Hu Yaobang	post-1972 talks
Huang Zhen	post-1972 travel post-1972 talks Marshall Mission
Jiang Nanxiang	post-1972 travel
Kang Keqing (f)	post-1972 talks
Song Renqiong	No known connections
Wan Li	post-1972 travel post-1972 talks
Wang Congwu	No known connections
Wang Heshou	No known connections
Wang Zhaoguo	No known connections
Wang Zhen	No known connections
Wu Xiuquan	Marshall Mission post-1972 talks
Xi Zhongxun	post-1972 travel post-1972 talks
Yang Shangkun	No known connections
Yong Wentao	No known connections
Yu Qiuli	post-1972 talks

Appendix B5 (Continued)

Zhang Xiushan	No known connections
Zheng Tianxiang	No known connections

Appendix B6

Current Specialization

Bo Yibo	Government:industry
Chen Yeping	Party:organizational affairs
Deng Liqun	Party:propaganda
Gan Weihan	Military:management/staff
Gu Dachun	Party:mass representative
Guo Jian (f)	Government:industry
Han Guang	Party:organizational affairs
Hong Xuezhi	Military:management/modernization
Hu Qiaomu	Party:propaganda
Hu Qili	Party:organizational work
Hu Yaobang	Party:general policy/management
Huang Zhen	Party:organizational work
Jiang Nanxiang	Party:propaganda
Kang Keqing (f)	Party:mass representative
Song Renqiong	Party:organizational work
Wan Li	Government:general policy/management
Wang Congwu	Party:organizational work
Wang Heshou	Party:organizational work
Wang Zhaoguo	Party:mass representative
Wang Zhen	Military:management/modernization
Wu Xiuquan	Military:general policy/management
Xi Zhongxun	Party:general policy/management
Yang Shangkun	Military:general policy/management
Yong Wentao	Government:agriculture
Yu Qiuli	Military:management/staff
Zhang Xiushan	Government:propaganda
Zheng Tianxiang	Government:judicial affairs

Appendix B7

Current Positions

Bo Yibo	VC, CCP CAC (since Sep 82) Mbr, Stdg Cmte, CCP CAC (since Sep 82) Mbr, CCP CAC (since Sep 82) State Councillor (since May 82) Vice Min, State Cmsn for Restructuring Economic System (since May 82) Perm VC, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83) Mbr, Provisional CCP Cmte, CCP CAC (since Dec 83)
Chen Yeping	Dir, Organization Dept, CCP-CC (since Feb 83) Mbr, CCP CAC (since Sep 82) Mbr, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83)
Deng Liqun	Sec, CCP Secretariat (since Sep 82) Mbr, 12th CCP-CC (since Sep 82) Dir, Policy Research Ofc, CCP Secretariat (since Mar 81) Dep Dir, General Ofc, CCP-CC (since Apr 81) Adviser, China Enterprise Mgmt Assn, State Economic Cmsn (since Oct 79) Vice Pres, Chinese Acad of Social Sciences (since Mar 78) VC, Central 5-4-3 Cmte (since Mar 83) Mbr, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83)
Gan Weihan	Dep Dir, PLA GPD (since May 80) Sec, CCP Disc Insp Cmsn, PLA (since Dec 80) Mbr, CCP CAC (since Sep 82) Mbr, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83)
Gu Dachun	Mbr, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation VC, All-China Fed of Trade Unions (since Oct 78)
Guo Jian (f)	Mbr, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83) Dep Dir Gen, CAAC (since Sep 79) VC, Board of Dir, China Merchants Steam Navigation Co (since May 81)
Han Guang	Sec, CCP Disc Insp Cmsn (since Sep 82) Mbr, Stdg Cmte, CCP Disc Insp Cmsn (since Sep 82) Mbr, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83)
Hong Xuezhì	Dir, PLA GLD (since Feb 80) Dep Sec Gen, CCP Military Cmsn (since Oct 82) Mbr, Central Military Cmsn (sinc Jun 83)

Appendix B7 (Continued)

Hong Xuezhi, continued	2d Sec, PLA GLD CCP Cmte (since NLT Oct 82) Dir, 2d Office of Natl Defense (since Feb 79) Mbr, 12th CCP-CC (since Sep 82) Mbr, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83)
Hu Qiaomu	Mbr, 12th CCP Political Bureau (since Sep 82) Mbr, 12th CCP-CC (since Sep 82) Honorary Pres, CASS (since Aug 82) Honorary Pres, China Wildlife Conservation Assn (since Dec 83) Adv, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83)
Hu Qili	Sec, CCP Secretariat (since Sep 82) Mbr, 12th CCP-CC (since Sep 82) Dir, General Ofc, CCP-CC (since May 82) Sec, Communist Youth League (since Sep 79) Chmn, All-China Youth Fed (since May 79) VC, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83)
Hu Yaobang	Mbr, Stdg Cmte, 12th CCP Political Bureau (since Sep 82) Gen Sec, 12th CCP-CC (since Sep 82) Mbr, 12th CCP-CC (since Sep 82) Dep, 6th NPC (Beijing)(since Jun 83) Chmn, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83)
Huang Zhen	Mbr, CCP CAC (since Sep 82) Mbr, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83) Adv, Foreign Affairs Cmte, NPC (since Dec 83)
Jiang Nanxiang	Mbr, 12th CCP-CC (since Sep 82) 1st Vice Pres, Party School (since NLT Sep 82) Mbr, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83)
Kang Keqing (f)	VC, 6th CPPCC (since Jun 83) Dep, 6th NPC (Jiangxi) (since Jun 83) Mbr, 12th CCP-CC (since Sep 82) Chmn, All-China Womens Fed (since Sep 78) Mbr, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83)
Song Renqiong	Mbr, 12th CCP Political Bureau (since Sep 82) possible Mbr, Stdg Cmte, CCP Military Cmsn (since Aug 81) Mbr, 12th CCP-CC (since Sep 82) Adv, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83)
Wan Li	Mbr, 12th CCP Political Bureau (since Sep 82)

Appendix B7 (Continued)

Wan Li, continued	<p>Sec, CCP Secretariat (since Feb 80) Vice Premier, State Council (since Apr 80) Mbr, 12th CCP-CC (since Sep 82) Chmn, Central 5-4-3 Cmte (since Mar 83) VC, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83) Hon Chmn, China Urban Science Society (since Jan 84)</p>
Wang Congwu	<p>Sec, CCP Disc Insp Cmsn (since Sep 82) Mbr, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83)</p>
Wang Heshou	<p>VC, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83) Mbr, 12th CCP-CC (since Sep 82) Perm Sec, CCP Disc Insp Cmsn (since Sep 82)</p>
Wang Zhaoguo	<p>1st Sec, 11th CYL (since Dec 82) Mbr, 12th CCP-CC (since Sep 82) Mbr, 11th CYL-CC (since Dec 82) Mbr, Stdg Cmte, 6th NPC (since Jun 83) Dep, 6th NPC (Hubei) (since Jun 83) Mbr, CCP Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83) Chief Rep, 21st Century Cmte for Chinese-Japanese Friendship (since Mar 84)</p>
Wang Zhen	<p>Mbr, 12th CCP Political Bureau (since Sep 82) Mbr, Stdg Cmte, CCP Military Cmsn (since Sep 80) Pres, CCP Central Party School (since May 82) Mbr, 12th CCP-CC (since Sep 82) Dep, 6th NPC (Hebei) (since Jun 83) Honorary Pres, China-Japan Friendship Assn (since NLT Oct 83) Adv, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83) Honorary Director in Chief, China Welfare Fund for the Handicapped (since Mar 84)</p>
Wu Xiuquan	<p>Dep Chief, PLA GSD (since May 75) Mbr, Stdg Cmte, CCP CAC (since Sep 82) Dir, Beijing Inst for Intl Strategic Studies (since Jun 79) Pres, PLA Armymen's Assn (since Jun 79) Mbr, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83) Sec, Provisional CCP Cmte, CCP CAC (since Dec 83)</p>
Xi Zhongxun	<p>Mbr, 12th CCP Political Bureau (since Sep 82) Sec, CCP Secretariat (since Jun 81) Mbr, 12th CCP-CC (since Sep 82) Adv, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83)</p>

Appendix B7 (Continued)

Yang Shangkun	Mbr, 12th CCP Political Bureau (since Sep 82) Exec VC, CCP Military Cmsn (since Sep 82) Sec Gen, CCP Military Cmsn (since Jul 81) VC, Central Military Cmsn (since Jun 83) Mbr, 12th CCP-CC (since Sep 82) Adv, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83)
Yong Wentao	Min, Ministry of Forestry (since Sep 80) Mbr, CCP CAC (since Sep 82) Mbr, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83)
Yu Qiuli	Mbr, 12th CC Political Bureau (since Sep 82) Sec, CCP Secretariat (since Feb 80) State Councillor (since May 82) Dep Sec Gen, CCP Military Cmsn (since Dec 82) Mbr, Central Military Cmsn (since Jun 83) Dir, PLA GPD (since Sep 82) Mbr, 12th CCP-CC (since Sep 82) Dep, 6th NPC (PLA) (since Jun 83) VC, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83)
Zhang Xiushan	Mbr, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83) Mbr, CCP CAC (since Sep 82) Dep Ldr, Educated Youth Ldg Group, State Council (since Aug 79)
Zheng Tianxiang	Pres, Supreme People's Court (since Jun 83) Mbr, CCP Central Cmsn for Guiding Party Consolidation (since Oct 83)

Appendix B8

Military Branch of Service

Gan Weihai	Army:political affairs
Hong Xuezhi	Army:logistics
Wang Zhen	Army:research & development
Wu Xiuquan	Army:intelligence
Yang Shangkun	Army:policy/planning
Yu Qiuli	Army:political affairs